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Abstract 
The following provides a brief overview of one of the founders of conflict studies, John Burton, 
and his Basic Human Needs theory. Since Burton is seldomly cited in contemporary scholarship
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the following relies heavily on the reflections of David Dunn, published in 2004 and on a 
collection of writings written by Burton’s colleagues in 1990. While a set of questions remain 
incredibly important — are needs universal, how do they differ from interests and desires, do they 
exist in a hierarchy of importance, and, what is the relation between needs and culture? — the 
following concentrates primarily on two features that deserve re-examination and further 
reflection: first, what is the significance of the difference between Burton’s understanding of 
“puzzle-solving” and “problem-solving” and, second,  how does Burton envision the term his 
created term of “proventing” conflict. Finally, does Human Needs Theory provide an 
emancipatory agenda for action or does it simply offer a critique of existing institutions and 
systems? Do we need to go beyond Burton? 
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Introduction 
 
The starting point for John Burton’s understanding of destructive conflict and a critique of social 
institutions is a basic orientation — a sociology of knowledge — that can be critical of received 
and accepted frames of reference and understanding. Said another way, the sociology of 
knowledge examines the ways different set if given variables are understood and utilized and are 
then placed within a given context, rather than simply being accepted as Truth. Burton’s project, 
discussed below, follows this reasoning and is based on the premise that human needs theory 
provides a way to overhaul the numerous shortcomings Burton perceived in international 
relations theory and other fields that deal with human conflict. For Burton, unmet human needs 
are the engine that drive conflict, especially seemingly intractable conflict: for those with unmet 
human needs no amount of coercion and deterrence will bring compliance (in the longer run) to 
oppression.  The following concludes with a discussion of Burton’s vision for dealing with 
conflict: the implications of problem-solving workshops and provention. 
David Dunn recently reassessed Burton’s work and human needs theory in From Power 
Politics to Conflict Resolution (2004). A general search of the conflict and peace literature in the 
1990’s reveals that while the promise of human needs for theory development has never fully 
materialized, the promise of human needs for developing strategies of resolving conflict has been 
developed and has been fruitful (Druckman and Mitchell, 1995; Dukes, 1996; Fisher, 1997; 
Jabri, 1996; Jeong, 2018; Mitchell and Banks, 1996). The latest book on Burton and human 
needs does not suggest that Burton’s influence reached into other fields or contemporary ideas 
outside of conflict resolution and peace studies (See Dunn, 2004, Chp 8). While conflict 
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resolution practitioners have been applying human needs in variations of the problem-solving 
workshop (Kelman, 2008; Lundy and Darkwah, 2018), it is less evident that scholarship in other 
fields has been influenced directly by Burton (Caballero-Anthony, 2016). Also, despite the 
tremendous influence of John Burton and human needs theory for the fields of conflict and peace 
studies (Jeong, 2008), Burton and needs theory specifically are rarely mentioned in the most 
recent conflict and peace studies literature. Furthermore, even though some claim the field of 
international relations to be in a crisis, Burton and needs theory is rarely mentioned nor are the 
insights of needs theory further developed in the emerging fields, each with their own journals, 
of security studies and transitional justice. However, the general insights of Burton are included 
in the focus on human security, conflict prevention, and transitional justice (see Barash, 2010; 
Caballero-Anthony, 2016; Cardone, 2011; Daase and Friesendorf, 2010; Howard, 2008; Jeong, 
2016; Richmond, 2007; Rubenstein, 2017; Wood, 2018). 
Conflict resolution scholar-practitioners have recognized that John Burton’s Basic 
Human Needs theory is controversial and that opposing claims are made in connection with all 
the basic issues (Burton, 1990a). Nonetheless, conflict and peace practitioners and scholars 
acknowledge the way forward resonates within the dynamics and parameters of much of what 
Burton was exploring and pursuing. While this new research does not cite Burton and many of 
his associates, much of it complements and articulates the continuing ideas of Basic Human 
Needs. Burton (and his associates) were correct in identifying the problems—unmet human 
needs cannot be contained by coercion (for very long). Unmet human needs are at the root of 
conflict.  
Burton offers a critique of human society — institutions are controlled by elites and serve 
elites, and individuals are expected to conform to the institutions controlled by elites. If 
individuals do not conform, they will be coerced. However, no amount of coercion will bring 
long-term stable order if basic needs are unmet. Also, Burton does suggest a method for moving 
forward—problem solving workshops. First, the situation must be assessed as to whether a 
puzzle-solving or a problem-solving approach is best, and second, that the provention of conflict 
by looking to the future and creating a new frame of reference with people (not institutions 
controlled by elites) at the center of analysis and policy. Bringing people to the center of analysis 
and problem-solving means that individuals are taken seriously and that individuals are essential 
for resolving conflict. Much has been written on Burton’s Basic Human Needs—for example, a 
multi-volume work explores many facets and details of human needs theory (see Burton and 
Dukes, 1990a and 1990b).  
“The primary level of analysis is the individual not the society or state. Following from 
this, need fulfillment is essential to the proper functioning of the human individual…not 
subservient or compliant…” (Dunn, 2004, p. 102). The organization of society is means to an 
end, not an end in itself. Individuals are neither innately good or bad but are profoundly social. It 
is authorities, seeking to maintain the functioning system that make wrong assumptions and often 
make a situation worse. Rather, society should serve the needs of the members; therefore, social 
systems need to be dynamic and malleable. The existence of conflict is central as it signals that 
needs are unmet. Systems commonly respond the symptoms of conflict—noncompliance to rules 
and norms—rather than the cause of conflict—unmet needs. Therefore, need to separate causes 
and symptoms, which requires understanding the needs of others and being responsive to them. 
The following provides a very brief overview of needs theory by exploring writings of 
those who knew John Burton and therefore had direct connections to Basic Human Needs. While 
a set of questions are incredibly important — are needs universal, how do they differ from 
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interests and desires, do they exist in a hierarchy of importance, and, what is the relation between 
needs and culture?
 2
 — the following concentrates primarily on two features: first, what is the 
significance of the difference between Burton’s understanding of “puzzle-solving” and, second, 
does need “problem-solving” and how does Burton envision the term his created term of 
“proventing” conflict.  The starting point is a basic orientation — a sociology of knowledge — 
that can be critical of received and accepted frames of reference and understanding. Said another 
way, the sociology of knowledge examines the ways different set if given variables are 
understood and utilized and are then placed within a given context, rather than simply accepted 
as Truth. Additionally, the question is raised whether needs theory simply offers a critique of 
existing social arrangements and recognizes unmet human needs or if human needs does offer an 
emancipatory agenda for action. For Burton, unmet human needs are the engine that drives 
conflict, especially seemingly intractable conflict: for those with unmet human needs no amount 
of coercion and deterrence will bring compliance (in the longer run) to oppression.  The 
following concludes with a discussion of the implications of problem-solving and provention. 
John Burton discusses “the important topic of the relationship between theorist and 
practitioner” because the “theorist has a practical role to play” (1990, p. 154). While commonly 
separated analytically, the two are intimately connected if and when conflict resolution processes 
are applied because successful resolution requires an accurate definition of the situation (Burton 
1979).  Burton continues, an accurate definition of the conflict situation requires an appropriate 
theory of human behavior because “this is the starting point of any analysis of any situations of 
conflict” (1990, p. 155).  For Burton, the starting point for conflict analysis is needs theory and 
“must be regarded as the core of the study of conflict, its analysis and resolution” (1990, p. 155).  
To state again, Burton insists that analysis and attempted resolution of conflict without the 
ontological assumptions of needs theory is faulty and perhaps dangerous.  Burton follows that 
conflict “resolution depends on a thorough analysis of the needs to be satisfied, and the failings 
of societies to satisfy them” (1990, p. 150).  Burton directs special attention to assumptions that 
underlie conflict analysis and the possible means of resolving conflict.  The following briefly 
explores the assumptions of needs theory, the assessment of needs theory from the perspectives 
of various conflict scholar-practitioners, and finally begins to examine needs theory from 
Burton’s problem-solving approach. 
In defense of Basic Human Needs, Burton cautions that two orientations towards conflict 
can be inadequate and even detrimental to its resolution: conflict management and pragmatism.  
For Burton, neither approach is properly informed by the reflective nature of theoretical 
concerns.  First, a “management” approach is “restricted and limited” because the training of the 
intervener is limited — they work within the current system.  Therefore, deep sources of conflict 
may remain implicit, and, finally, if the deep issues are made explicit, they will frequently be 
mishandled by the management techniques.
3
  In this way, management techniques, while 
adequate for negotiations, are not adequate for conflicts that involve core “nonnegotiable” 
human needs. 
 
Puzzle-solving 
 
The first approach is taken by Joe Scimecca: “I will argue that the field of conflict resolution is 
best served via an emphasis upon a parsimonious modification of Basic Human Needs theory as 
a best available starting point for a prescriptive theory of conflict resolution” (1990, p. 205). 
Scimecca takes this position because, he continues, “I still believe that this human need theory 
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represents the most sophisticated and fully developed theory of conflict resolution available 
today” (1990, p. 207).   
   Scimecca attempts to shift attention away from biologically based needs to sociologically 
based needs by showing that ontological human needs can be derived from a non-genetically 
determined basis (1990, 207).  Scimecca identifies freedom and self-consciousness as basic 
ontological needs.  He recognized both positive and negative freedom as two basic types of 
freedom.  Negative freedom is freedom in the existential sense, such as Jean-Paul Sartre’s curse 
of freedom as a burden for the modern individual (1992).  Positive freedom exists as two subsets, 
the first is freedom from restraint and the second is the “freedom to develop” (Scimecca 1990, p. 
212).  This study is most concerned with freedom in the sense of the development of the 
individual’s capabilities, since “freedom to develop is more important than freedom from 
restraint.”  Freedom in the positive sense is “Freedom to develop in consort with others, to learn 
skills, to accumulate knowledge, to develop self-reflexivity” (Scimecca, 1990, p. 213).  This 
view is more in line with that of contemporary sociologists who stress the interaction of the 
individual and society for the fullest possible human development (Scimecca, 1981).   
The second fundamental human need, Scimecca explains, self-consciousness, is based in 
reflexivity and predicated on choice and awareness.  Drawing from sociological insights, choice 
and awareness are never totally free from social influence and are deeply embedded in social 
reality.  Rather, all choices are made within a context.
4
  Freedom then is both individual and 
social, as is self-reflexivity; neither is genetically or culturally determined (Scimecca 1990, p. 
214).  Scimecca continues to draw upon development as crucial to freedom: “without freedom to 
develop, the mind is restricted and we become less than human beings” (1990, p. 214).  
Therefore, he suggests using self-reflexivity and the freedom to develop to judge whether or not 
societies fulfill basic human needs.  Aside from stating that “authoritarian and totalitarian 
cultures” hinder self-reflexivity and freedom, Scimecca had little to say about the specific details 
of how to recognize self-reflection and development in the social world, and how to recognize if 
societies are fulfilling this basic human need.  He does stress that societies are to meet these 
needs.  Scimecca does not elaborate on exactly what society is and how society should determine 
and meet needs.  
  Karen Gillwald acknowledges that needs theory is capable of guiding clarification and 
creativity for conflict mitigation (1990, p. 115-124).  However, Gillwald cautions that “the 
resolution of deep-rooted conflict goes beyond the capacity of needs theory and methodology” 
(115).  She continues, while empirical research on “needs” focuses on specific satisfiers and can 
“help increase rationality in conflicts in two extreme cases — unconscious or repressed denials 
and counter-productive satisfiers” (1990, p. 121).  The shortcoming of needs theory is that it fails 
to offer “instruments with which to regulate competing, conflicting, or mutually exclusive terms” 
(1990, p. 122).  Gillwald’s complaint is that needs theory inadequately addresses, first, situations 
in which the different needs of one individual may be incompatible within the particular 
individual and, second, situations in which the needs of two or more individuals may be 
incompatible with others.  Might we consider taking a problem-solving approach to examining 
Basic Human Needs? 
 
Problem-solving 
 
Richard Rubenstein begins the discussion of the problem-solving approach by acknowledging 
that human needs is a latent version of natural law approach to human social relations (1990, p. 
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340) and is therefore subject to the criticism of natural law thinking — universal, permanent, 
supreme, and abstract (1990, p. 338) — and must advance beyond the level of truism (1990, p. 
343). Therefore, he continues, “if human needs theory is to escape the impact of this critique, 
reconstruction will be necessary” (1990, p. 340).  For Rubenstein, “Unless [human needs] can be 
used to generate new insights, however, the utility of the approach for conflict analysis and 
resolution will be severely limited” (1990, p. 344).  Can a new theory be built that avoids the 
pitfalls and limitations, can “historicity and concreteness” (1990, p. 344) be included in a theory 
for conflict resolution?  Although not mentioned by Rubenstein, complementing basic human 
needs with basic human responsibilities is a way to keep the insights of human needs and to 
include history and locality.  Rubenstein starts to move in this direction when he says that the 
human needs theory should move away from natural law by recognizing that structures are only 
“partial satisfiers of human needs” (1990, p. 347).5  The direction of inquiry is to explore what is 
implied in the self-reflective and development components of human needs. 
At this point, Rubenstein cautions: “needs theory (like natural law theory) frequently 
seems to have this ‘additive’ character — one uses it to restate or to confirm conclusions already 
arrived at by some other method” (1990, p. 344).  It is a foundation of human needs theory that 
social arrangements that obstruct the discovery or development of human nature should be 
changed (for the better).  Human needs theory thus has transformative implications—change 
oppressive social structures and humans will live harmoniously.  However, Rubenstein raises a 
complex and subtle point: “it is only through liberating struggle that humans discover what their 
true needs are, and how they may be truly satisfied” (1990, p. 349).  This raises a complexity in 
evaluating the legitimacy of human action and hints at the positive aspects of tension for human 
development.  Jack Donnelly
6
 writing on the positive role of struggle for human rights and the 
host of writers in the conflict tradition of sociology
7
 raise similar points.  Rubenstein summarizes 
this position: “if needs theory is to be founded on human nature, it must transcend the purely 
subjective, egoistic, non-developmental view of humanity…” (1990, p. 351). He continues: 
 
[Human needs] are watered fitfully by ‘satisfiers’ which, under present 
circumstances, do not and cannot satisfy fully and whose partiality continuously 
creates false stopping points in the development of human nature.  They can 
flower only in a future which permits men and women to become masters of 
production, of the state, and of themselves… (1990, p. 352) 
 
What Rubenstein seems to be implying is that human nature, to be fully realized, involves 
addressing the responsibility component of self-governing, both governing individual egoistic 
wants and desires and governing the state.  The idea of self-governing is pursued in the following 
chapters. What remains to be explored is the developmental view of humanity and the possible 
role that conflict and tension can play in this positive maturation of the human being.   
Mary Clark, agreeing with proponents of human needs theory that the problem of conflict 
does not lie in biological deficiency such as innate aggression of the individual, says the problem 
lies rather in “having become blind to the kind of society that satisfies our deepest human needs 
and having constructed, through a series of deficient social visions, institutions that deny rather 
than satisfy those needs” (1990, p. 37).  Clark is especially critical of the institutions of modern 
civilization.  For Clark, humans were first “social animals…wholly dependent on a supportive 
social structure, and it is in the absence of such a support system” that destructive behavior 
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occurs.  Clark continues that “civilized” societies since the dawn of recorded history is largely a 
record of frustrated members of those societies:  
 
It is perhaps not surprising that Hobbes misread the problem, for in his time the 
West was still largely ignorant of the evidence that would show that social 
institutions were failing to meet human needs, rather than that humankind suffers 
from some intrinsic behavioral maladaption. (Clark, 1990, p. 37) 
 
For Clark, humans are uniquely social beings and the problems of maladaptive, or anti-social, 
behavior of individuals stems from a maladaptive environment of civilization itself, not from the 
individual. 
Clark emphasizes that social bondings are not merely temporary contracts merely for the 
convenience of individuals but are absolute requirements for human existence: “social 
embeddedness is the essence of our nature” (1990, p. 49).  This is especially evident, in Clark’s 
analysis, because the Western attitude of logical and rational decision-making (rather than 
including emotions) are constructed from the point of view of an “isolated individual who ought 
to be as free as possible from social constraints…” (1990, p. 49).  Therefore, social discussions 
“almost totally fail to ask why institutions of society are in fact acting against or even actively 
preventing social bonding” (Clark 1990, p. 49).  The problem with contemporary Western 
institutions, for Clark, is a lack of the promotion of social bonding.
8
  Correlating with the decline 
in social bonding are the increasing costs of managing social anomie: increases in social welfare 
programs, more police, courtrooms and prisons, and more social workers and psychiatrists (Clark 
1990, p. 54).  For Clark, the large-scale institutional changes in the West bring more problems 
than they solve. 
Mary Clark begins her exploration of human needs by cautioning that “human needs 
theory must carefully avoid becoming merely a description of the self-perceived ‘needs’ of the 
particular group that is developing the theory” (1990, p. 34).  Referring to the development of 
human needs theory in the Western intellectual tradition, Clark warns that this “narrowness could 
have unfortunate consequences globally”, therefore, what is needed is “conscientiously to 
identify and critique as many of the assumptions underlying our own thinking” (1990, p. 34).  
Clark’s observations is that the western tradition is concerned primarily with the individual and 
that the “current fission of the concepts of ‘the individual’ and ‘society’ into separate, often 
warring, compartments blinds us to the fact that these are one thing” (1990, p. 37).9  Whether or 
not the concept of social bonding is best to describe “social embeddedness,” Clark is pointing in 
the direction that assumptions about needs and social relations need to be re-examined.  
  In summary, for Scimecca, Rubenstein, and Clark, needs theory provides a useful critique 
of contemporary society and contemporary thinking, yet is still incomplete and inadequate.  
Whether to proceed in a puzzle-solving mode or a problem-solving mode depends on ontological 
assumptions.  All three scholars provide hints as to where to proceed from here: examine 
assumptions and explore the developmental view and reflectivity.  For Oscar Nudler, needs — 
both “fundamental” and “derived” — are not easily compartmentalized because they “cut across 
the whole person and achieve a multi-dimensional inner resonance.”10  Nudler eschews the more 
common isolation of biological/psychological/social needs and rather views needs as making a 
system whereby fundamental universal needs are patterned around cultural and individual 
circumstances because basic (universal) needs are mediated by culture.  These insights on the 
increased complexity of isolating human needs and a focus on human development lead in the 
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direction of human responsibilities and self-governing. Can we glean some insights in moving 
forward from Burton’s discussion of conflict prevention? 
 
Provention 
 
For Burton conflict provention — anticipating the peaceful future — comes directly out of a 
focus on opportunities for human development rather than on institutional constraints (1990, p. 
253).  For Burton: 
 
We have a language of democracy, freedoms, rights and justice, and we 
sometimes fail to place these concepts in the context of their origins—that is, a 
reaction against repressive systems, the essential structures of which we have 
inherited. (1990, p. 73) 
 
Burton mentions development as a human need several times and frames his analysis in terms of 
reactions to systems that oppress individuals.  However, he did not explore what development 
means beyond the freedom for an individual to choose and the elimination of repressive 
structures that limit those choices.  What he did not explore further are the dimensions of human 
development that also include individual responsibilities. What is required is a robust sociology 
of knowledge that applies a statement such as “The models, terms and concepts that we have 
inherited lurk in the back of our minds, frustrate the development of alternative theories, and 
distort our perceptions of the present” (Burton 1990, 74) to be directed back at a human needs 
approach to begin to explore what is involved in human development.   
The importance of an adequate theory of conflict is restated when Burton addresses 
pragmatism, the second common approach in dealing with conflict.  Burton cautions that a 
“pragmatic” approach to conflict is potentially problematic because pragmatism implies “and 
absence of knowledge…and theory” (Burton 1990, pp. 19-20).  In this approach to conflict, a 
pragmatist, according to Burton, simply employs intuition and unconsciously held theories on a 
trial and error basis.  While the intervener may happen to help resolve a conflict (or not), the risk 
in using this “method” is that the structural and institutional sources of the conflict may remain 
unexamined, and thus they are “likely to lead in the longer term to even more costly disputes and 
planning mistakes…and perhaps to [greater] social disruption” (Burton 1990, p. 21).  Burton 
wants to be clear that while pragmatism may at times be necessary, pragmatism should still be 
understood as a “phase in knowledge development” (Burton 1990, p. 22).  While pragmatism is a 
natural and inevitable phase in the development of a practice it should be recognized that it is a 
“phase in a paradigm shift…but not yet a switch to a new paradigm” (Burton 1990, p. 22).  The 
problem arises when pragmatism moves from an intuitive trial and error attempt to being defined 
as a positive ‘science’” (Burton 1990, p. 22).  For Burton, this is “dangerous” because it is not 
connected to a theoretical base.  Burton’s assessment of the field of conflict studies is that, while 
making progress, “is still a field in which theorists and practitioners assert their preferences and 
make claims in the absence of any widespread understanding” (Burton 1990, p. 10).  Burton is 
convinced that the framework of Realpolitik and deterrence are inadequate to the current socio-
political conditions, yet he cautions about being overly confident at present with the current state 
of conflict resolution which is located primarily in pragmatism and “devoid of any theoretical 
base on which they can be assessed” (Burton 1990, p. 10).  
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In contrast to pragmatism, John Burton describes the “general thesis” of conflict 
resolution as resting on complete analysis of conflict and “underlying this general thesis is a 
theoretical assumption that parties to a conflict have shared goals — that is, the pursuit of human 
needs common to all” (1990, p. 328).  Burton goes on to state that these “problems” are “located 
in relationships” such as “identity and recognition” and that these need not be in short supply, 
unlike physical resources (1990, p. 328).  Burton does little to expand upon the relational aspect, 
except that it involves perceiving accurately the “depths of feelings and the frustrations 
experienced by the other” (1990, p. 328).  It is the (empathic) relational social dynamic that 
remains the least explored by Burton.  He reverts to a liberal social ontology — freedom from 
coercion — when he emphasizes that accurate analysis is located in “the extent to which 
apparently hostile behaviors are the consequence of environmental constraints” (1990, p. 328).  
His analysis is directed at those with power, force and control of resources, and not to all 
members of social community.  To what extent, and how, are the oppressed to be involved in 
self-governing?  This is an important point since we may ask to what extent are we all complicit?  
For example, Franz Fanon, writing on (and supporting) the revolution for independence in 
Algeria, cautioned that the oppressed must always be vigilant against simply reversing the terms 
and groups oppressed in their fight for emancipation (1964).   
How is a conflict practitioner to approach Fanon’s concern?  The following briefly 
explores some of John Burton’s insights concerning the role of the conflict resolution scholar-
practitioner, especially towards “problem-solving” connected as a general orientation for conflict 
scholars.  This leads directly to incorporating Burton’s own insights in reflecting upon the 
implications of his insights towards examining his own writings. 
To review, Burton also changed the focus from states to people. Burton also explored 
deviance not as a threat to a system but rather as how deviance was defined, who defined it, and 
to illuminate the nature of the system or society that was classifying the behavior as “deviant”, or 
“deviant in relation to what exactly?” (Dunn, 2004, p. 97). People in conflict attempt to gain the 
same thing: security and certainty (Dunn, 2004, p. 97). Once the concept of needs was at the 
center of the conceptual map “other things were made possible” (Dunn, 2004, p. 98). Parson’s 
classical functionalist sociology emphasis society as self-equilibrating systems and tend to a 
condition of stability. Deviance therefore evokes conditions of control to counter and contain it. 
Functionalism emphasizes adaptation to the system rather than conflict with and within the 
system. Burton problematizes what is ignored in functionalism: why and to what extent should 
the individual adapt to the system and promote the system? (98). Borrowing from Sites, Burton 
posits needs at the socio-biological level. In this way, needs are ontological—they form a base 
and basis of individual human behavior. Socialization and conformity and the contrasting 
behaviors of resistance and deviance are conventions and norms held by collectives and groups. 
Those who are deviant can be marginalized, criminalized, incarcerated, and even executed.  
John Burton (1979, pp. xi-xiv & 3-38) makes a deliberate distinction between “puzzles” 
and “problems”, between “closed systems” and “open systems”, and between “normal” or 
“applied” science and “pure science.”  For Burton, the conflict scholar-practitioner is dealing 
with unsolved problems located in open systems that require pure science.  A puzzle implies that 
a final solution exists in a closed system and can be solved by the application of available 
theories or techniques.  However, problems, for Burton, are qualitatively distinct — “having the 
opposite characteristics” (1979, p. 5) — from puzzles because they exist in open systems and 
cannot be solved with the application of “current” theories or techniques (1979, p. 3-4).  As open 
systems, problems lack final solutions because the solution is itself a set of relationships that 
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(potentially) contain a new set of problems and also interact in a larger changing environment.  
Finally, problems “frequently require a new synthesis or a change in theoretical structure” (1979, 
p. 5).  Burton presents two different elements of problems related to complications in attempts at 
“solving” them.  The first is the ontological condition of problems — they are embedded in 
social relationships that are not static but dynamic — and change themselves during 
investigation: “While the problem is being analyzed its nature is altering and the behaviour of the 
parts being analyzed is altering” (1979, p. 5).  The second involves reflection and critique of the 
“dominant theories” of applied and normal science “to question all the implied assumptions, 
attitudes and theories, to put forward alternatives hypotheses…” (1979, p. 6).  The first element 
of problems relates, again, to the dynamism in the ontological condition of human social being.  
The second element relates to the cognitive framework(s) by which human social beings 
understand (and are shaped by and shape) the social world.  
 Many conflict scholar-practitioners have focused on the first element of problems that 
Burton described, discussed above.  Burton’s critique is against those, especially from the field 
of international relations and related fields, who have directed less attention at the second feature 
of addressing problems — a critique of the assumptions of dominant theories themselves.  
Burton outlines his “methodology” of problem-solving in the first chapter of Deviance, 
Terrorism and War (1979) by emphasizing the extent to which features of analysis are socially 
constructed and the role of a critical posture towards those social constructions, including 
theories of order, change and conflict.  
The range of the indeterminate nature of the social world for Burton is evident in the 
methodological steps he prescribes.  The malleability of investigation of social science is evident 
in Burton’s understanding of research, ranging from “selection of the problem” and “boundaries 
of the area of inquiry” to the demarcation of “relevant source material,” “defining the problem” 
and designing and evaluating interventions (1979, p. 10-38).  Burton, in his critique of 
international relations based in Realpolitik, states that “it could be that we are tackling our 
apparently insoluble problems within a system of thought that…excludes the possibility of 
solution” (1979, p. 19) and offers the possibility that what may need examination is the “system 
of thought being employed by the investigator” (1979, p. 26).  The remainder of Deviance, 
Terrorism and War is engaged in critical analysis that questions the underlying assumptions of 
current policies, for example, of conventional theories of deviant behavior.  Burton’s diagnosis is 
to reexamine the frameworks of the analysts themselves “whenever policies are seen to fail to 
achieve objectives” (1979, p. 41).  He states bluntly that part of the problem may reside in 
“conventional wisdom” and rather than pursuing more knowledge based and interpreted within 
this framework, the task is now to “ask ‘what are the assumptions on which ‘facts’ are selected 
and interpreted?” (1979, p. 41).  Burton is clear that his project is informed both by the flawed 
outcomes of intervention strategies and the policies which guide them.  But his project is deeper: 
it is to question the assumptions on which strategies and policies are based, which include 
“prevailing value systems, definitions of problem behavior, conceptions of morality, notions of 
law and order and ideas about the role of authority” (1979, p. 41).   
 How does an analyst-researcher go about this task of questioning the underlying 
assumptions of conventional wisdom?  For Burton, this requires “imagination”, “an ability to 
question conventional wisdom”, and “a willingness to be a dissident” (1979, p. 9) by not simply 
accepting “the ruling dogma of the day” and instead taking an approach that leads to an 
alternative set of assumptions” (1979, p. 6).   
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John Burton begins “The Two Paradigms,” by stating “When societies tackle their social 
problems there is a set of givens, a paradigm, that together form a generally agreed approach” 
(1979, p. 159) and acknowledges that shifts in values, norms, attitudes, behaviors and conditions 
do occur, but overall, they are understood within a given framework.  For Burton, these 
frameworks represent fairly stable ontological frameworks and shifts represent only minor 
adjustments because “these shifts occur within an essentially unchanged set of givens or 
conventional assumptions about the nature of human behavior, of society and of the norms 
observed” (1979, p. 159).  Therefore, Burton calls for a more radical examination of common 
assumptions (1979), to examine and escape from the restraints of these frameworks.  Burton is 
asking for a change in thinking, away from the “assumptions inherent in conventional thinking” 
for two reasons: they do not explain observed behavior and they do not provide adequate long-
term solutions to ongoing problems (1979, p. 161).
11
  
The question here is whether the framework of human needs and liberalism is best suited 
to address these concerns.  Rather, as will become clearer, moving from a narrow framework of 
“needs” and “freedom from…” to include a broader framework of human responsibilities and 
liberty points in the direction of finding an “appropriate means” (1990, p. 328) to address the 
relational dynamic of conflict.  For example, Burton describes security as need for everyone, and 
argues that increased security for one party of a conflict increases security for all parties.  The 
problem is that usual means to security limit the possibility of it being shared.
12
  A human needs 
approach, focusing upon what individuals require for themselves, alludes or pushes to the 
background, the possible necessity of including basic responsibilities that follow (possible) 
emancipation, or said another way, what comes after the revolution?  The fundamental question, 
unaddressed by a human needs approach, is what is required to sustain self-governing — what is 
required to sustain a movement from violence to politics?  A human responsibilities approach 
(that does not remove human needs) that expands social ontology to include ongoing 
participation in self-governing relationships is one answer.  The freedom required in “human 
development” is crucial, but is it enough to sustain polities of participation?  The following study 
will argue that human responsibilities are needed to complement human needs. 
Burton adds another variable to his consideration of conflict — the future — and invents 
a new term to address it — provention (1990, p. 161).  Burton explains: provention is a “more 
fundamental study and exercise…it is a decision-making process in which the future is analyzed 
and anticipated” (1990, p. 161).  For Burton, the problem with different forms of governing, even 
representative political systems, is that no current political system has yet been discovered that 
gives adequate priority to the future.  Such a system, accordingly, would be conflict avoidant in 
the positive sense.  The move for conflict resolution as a discipline is to configure a political 
governing future as an “extension of analytical conflict resolution…because there emerges a 
whole new political approach to decision-making” (1990, p. 162).  Burton shows no hesitation 
when he states it is “clear that provention must rest heavily on the theory and practice of conflict 
resolution” as the means by which insights are obtained into the nature of political problems 
(1990, p. 162)  However, Burton restates that political philosophies must be oriented towards the 
future and “must rest on reliable theories of human behaviors” (1990, p. 163).  Here Burton is 
combining two dimensions of social life, the moral philosophy of politics and the virtues of 
intersubjective decision-making, what could also be described as the responsibility of self-
governing (1990, p. 164).   
For Burton, human knowledge is part of a cultural evolutionary process, with the human 
needs approach contributing to the progression of knowledge.  However, he allows that further 
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developments are necessary (1990, p. 177).  Burton is committed to a human needs theoretical 
framework that defines more precisely what these needs actually are and therein developing 
“more understanding of the structural sources of conflict13 and the need to seek institutional 
policy options that cater to human requirements” (1990, p. 177).  Rather than humans adjusting 
to institutional requirements, Burton sees this as a transitional period in which governing is no 
longer catering to “power-elite interests” and to “the nature of which is far from clear” (1990, p. 
178).  Burton rightly acknowledges that this transition is a confusing and difficult one, raising 
questions of “ethics, relevance, justice, constitutional rights, human rights, human needs and a 
host of others” (1990, p. 178).  He ends assessing the current situation in human socio-political 
evolution declaring that system-preserving approaches are inadequate to address the fundamental 
issues of the future and the problems associated with ongoing and systemic oppression and 
suggests that problem-solving conflict-resolution leading to provention is going in the right 
direction.   
Burton belongs to a counter-tradition in International Relations that, said one way, 
endorses Rousseau and dismisses Hobbes. For Hobbes, the primary human condition is that 
humans are self-interested and inherently aggressive and therefore social order and security 
requires a coercion and obedience to prevent a “war of all against all”. In contrast, for Rousseau, 
the civilization process itself has led to the accentuation of self-interest, emergence and 
protection of private property, and the development of laws that claim to serve all but actually 
serve elites and propertied and this has caused oppression and the civilization process has 
obscured social empathy. Therefore, Rousseau endorses the possibility and promise of large-
scale social change since the oppressed have “nothing to lose but their chains.” Said another 
way, Hobbes promote the status quo through deterrence and social control to prevent violence 
while Rousseau promotes the possibility of revolution and the recovery of social empathy. 
 For example, for some globalization is a threat and for others it is an opportunity—
whether the promise of international markets or the peril of cyberwar, and so on. For Dunn, in 
dealing with the change and uncertainty we do not need to reinvent the wheel, but we do need to 
be more aware that a number of disciplines are working on these areas of change, such as social 
theory, cultural studies, political economy, and so on, all informed by postmodernism (2004, p. 
159). Postmodernist approaches undermine foundationalism, but do not “define the agenda nor 
do they exhaust it…[therefore] Burton’s stress on needs is a valuable opening to the agenda” 
(Dunn, 2004, p. 159). For example, for Burton, social and cultural change are central elements, 
yet significantly underdeveloped and under-theorized in International Relations because IR is 
state-centric and primarily concerned with short term order and stability.  
 
Beyond Burton 
 
For Burton:  
 
“the transition that we are experiencing now from social policies based on 
allocation of values as determined by elites, to social policies that are influenced 
by the ontological needs of persons and communities is a dramatic and 
revolutionary one. It is this transition, and the inevitable defenses that are made 
against it, that best explain the high levels of domestic violence and communal 
and interstate conflict that are universal in contemporary world society (Burton, 
1984, p. 153). 
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For Dunn, “this passage sums up so much of what Burton has to say, in so many thousands of 
words: “For Burton, the problem is the selective perception of decision-makers” (2004, pp.125). 
John Burton’s work is a critique of “current policies that are wrong in their assumptions, wrong 
in their implementations, and wrong in their accumulated consequences” (Dunn 2004, 172. 
Burton replaced the state as the center of analysis with the human individual as the center of 
analysis. Importantly, rather than individuals adjusting and conforming to malfunctioning 
systems, systems should adjust to the needs of individuals.  
It is important to be clear that Burton emphasizes the behavior of the actors that ushers us 
to attend to the causes of the problem/conflict and distinguish them from symptoms. For Burton, 
individuals are not deviants because they are born ‘bad types.’ Rather, deviance is an expression, 
a symptom, of something deeper. For example, Palestinian youth armed with stones do not 
confront Israeli tanks because they are born that way or predetermined to be bad people. The 
behaviors emanate from unmet human needs and from the lived experience of the Palestinians.  
Burton is calling for nothing less than a “paradigm shift” in conventional thinking, drawing 
explicitly on the work of Thomas Kuhn (1962). For example, deviance is not a result of 
demoralization, deficiency, or pathology but rather a response to a social context. 
John Burton critiqued the dominant theories in various fields that related to dealing with 
human conflict and he presented an alternative based in human needs. However, did Burton 
present a robust alternative? For example, Burton states numerous times that problem-solving 
leads to win-win outcomes. So, what exactly is a win-win situation and how does it proceed? 
Dunn confirms suspicions that Burton opened the door to a new way, but did not provide every 
answer when he states: 
 
“…discussing the nature if win-win situations, is particularly illustrative of the 
Burton style. It is quick to challenge the existing sets of assumptions…He pithily 
makes and alternative, indeed at times radically subversive, point that challenges 
the very fundamentals of the established mode, and then leaves it, almost as if 
having made the point, then the implications are self-evident, the point made and 
the case can proceed. The discussion of win-win, so hugely significant in its 
implications, is here dealt with in fewer than five pages!” (Dunn, 2004, p. 122). 
 
Burton is correct, in many ways, to draw these insights and distinctions; however, as Dunn states 
accurately “the discussion needs filling out” (2004, p. 123). For example, the critique offered 
by Burton that conventional international relations is not the reality of lived experience of 
humanity, but a game, similar to other sports, played among elites. So where do we go from 
here?  
We should proceed with the notion that we might be wrong and how we might go about 
getting it right. However, Burton is first and foremost a classical liberal with an approach that is 
best designed to deconstruct and promote revolution. The terms he coined, provention, is part of 
another project, a constructive project—the problem-solving workshop.  Burton’s project is to 
clear the debris and landscape to prepare the ground to support fertile growth. As Dunn 
recognizes, we cannot be definitive about provention since much remains to be done in relation 
to the development of the details and criteria of provention. Most of what constitutes provention 
is either implied or undetermined. The key to the indeterminacy is that in proventing conflict 
Burton introduces the uncertainty of the open-system problem-solving workshop. 
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As David Dunn summarizes: “So often, ‘conventional wisdom’ is incapable of solving 
problems of human relationships, since it is informed by the wrong ontologies and 
epistemologies. So often, people are made to fit into norms, structures and processes that are said 
to serve the goals of good, order, justice, stability, normality, community, and conformity. We 
can understand clearly the goal of order as this is understood in International Relations, where 
the alternative is assumed to be war and chaos…Yet order comes to be the dominant goal in 
itself: challenges to certain conceptions of order or coerced, change is prevented, and certain 
interests are served. The problem is defined as one of system maintenance rather than system 
adaptation (Dunn, 2004, p. 171). In contrast, from a provention perspective, people are primary, 
change is constant, and structures (such as states) are the means to human betterment. From the 
viewpoint of prevention, we are dealing with novelties that do not fit with conventional 
assumptions and we should stop trying to make them fit; we should change our assumptions.  
 Dunn offers a way forward. Following Banks (1985a), Dunn suggests that teaching the 
next generation is paramount to understanding the challenges and promises of different 
approaches to conceptual innovation. Research is also important to develop conceptual 
innovation. But Dunn is limited in his description of provention. The central component is the 
human being and a turn to focus on the causes and not simply the symptoms of social conflict. 
Burton’s focus is primarily on excavating the wrong assumptions, wrong definitions of the 
problem, and wrong policies. Said another way, Burton recognized the irony that explained 
peace as based on the threat to kill millions and render continents vulnerable to complete 
devastation. For Burton, the world is so only because we have constructed it that way. We can 
construct it in another way. 
 
Next Steps 
 
John Burton critiques “conventional wisdom” because it is not only wrong but ultimately 
harmful; at the same time, Burton hesitates that his human needs framework “is still at an 
immature stage” (1990, p. 179). Burton, with human needs theory, does provide a legitimate and 
convincing critique of dominant and traditional understandings of elite dominated social systems 
that thwart meeting human needs of numerous persons. However, does he offer a positive or 
constructive project? While looking to the future, Burton overlooks the promise of nonviolence 
in building a just social order in the process of revolution, of building the type of society that 
satisfies human needs in the connection between means and ends in nonviolent social relations 
and participation (Vahabzadeh 2019). The ends — a non-oppressive social order — must be 
connected to the means in which that governing order is achieved (Beitzel, 2010).  What is 
required then, in the next of applying the insights of Basic Human Needs theory is to explore the 
complications and complexities of ethics and justice, not by abandoning a human needs approach 
completely, but by expanding Burton’s basic human needs ontology by adding human 
responsibilities as a complement to needs that lead finally towards self-governing and nonviolent 
problem-solving conflict resolution approach to maintain self-governance (Beitzel 2019, Marin 
et al, 2019).  Nonviolence is implicit in Burton’s writings, but not explicit.  For example, Burton 
cautions that the misapplication of a technique for dealing with conflict or a failure to properly 
understand the needs-basis of a deep-rooted conflict may only momentarily suppress a conflict 
and actually lead to further violence (1990, p. 8-9).   
Therefore, the way forward is not abandoning human needs, but complementing human 
needs with something like human responsibilities (Zartman, 2019).  To do so is to examine and 
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acknowledge the responsibilities persons have toward other persons needs in terms of the 
responsibility that individuals have both to themselves and towards others.  Said another way, 
one way to transcend the egoistic view of humanity with an exclusive focus on needs is to 
include basic human responsibilities — responsibilities to oneself and to others.  For the 
problem-solving workshops to function and deliver positive outcomes, needs of others be 
recognized and respected (O’Toole et al, 2019). The fundamental insight form Burton is that 
basic human needs are ontological and cannot be coerced out of existence (they can only be 
momentarily suppressed). To deal with unmet human needs, Burton develops the problem-
solving workshop which is based in human relationships and this is a very large step toward 
examining and including responsibility in conjunction with needs.  The problem-solving 
workshop in some variation or form, now utilized by those successfully working in conflict 
transformation, humanitarian intervention, transitional justice, and so on, is where to find and 
also nurture and build Burton’s insight for a way that is both positive and emancipatory (Marin et 
al, 2019; O’Toole, et al, 2019; Zartman, 2019). The challenging and liberating aspect is that this 
freedom to construct a different world brings with it uncertainty that accompanies indeterminacy.  
 
 
Notes 
                                            
1
 This is not necessarily alarming, nor does it suggest that Burton’s Human Needs Theory is 
irrelevant. For example, the argument, used by Burton, that elites control institutions and those 
institutions serve the self-interests of elites was developed by Jean Rousseau centuries earlier. It 
could be that Human Needs Theory became generally accepted at the level of normal science 
within the paradigm of conflict and peace studies. 
2
 Similar questions are also raised by Oscar Nudler, “On Conflicts and Metaphors” Conflict: 
Human Needs Theory, ed. John Burton, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1990, pp. 186.   
3
 In John Burton and Frank Dukes, Conflict, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1990, pp.18-19.  
Burton explains: “It has to be noted that in many cases perhaps most cases, mediation processes 
do more harm than good…They provide an answer to the particular case and, if successful, help 
to preserve that system or set of circumstances that give rise to the cases treated” (Burton and 
Dukes 1990, p. 160). 
4
 See Fritjof Bergmann, On Being Free, Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1977.  
Of course, sociologists have long made this contention. 
5
   In the section “Trends in Thinking about A Human Dimension”, Burton states that the 
reference point for understanding conflict is no longer in accord with the “Natural Law notion” 
of justice based on mysterious divine social order, but rather on “estrangement”5 due to “an 
absence of participation and social control” (1990, pp. 91).  For Burton, the new reference point 
is based on psychological and physical needs of individuals.  The social developments of 
modernization and the problems of legitimacy draw attention, for Burton, to the social problems 
and the impacts on individuals and point to analytical problem-solving processes to better 
address the social conditions that have led to estrangement of the non-elite individual — to 
increase the participation and control of all individuals (1990, pp. 91).   
6
 See Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2nd Edition), Ithaca, NY, 
Cornell University Press, 2003, for an extended discussion.   
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7
 See Randall Collins, Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science, New York, 
Academic Press, 1978, for a discussion of both the creative and destructive possibilities of social 
conflict. 
8
 Clark mentions three changes in Western civilization: the rise of the nuclear family, the 
“institution of competitive individualism” and “efficiency,” and the disappearance of sacred 
meaning (Clark 1990, pp. 49-51). 
9
 The idea of “bonding” is critiqued in a later section on civility and responsibility. 
10
 Oscar Nudler, “On Conflicts and Metaphors” Conflict: Human Needs Theory, ed. John Burton 
St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1990, pp. 186. 
11
 Burton lists influences for solving widespread social problems   
12
 Burton here implies, but does make explicit, that the means typically pursued by the party with 
power and resources is that of (military, police, policy, or legal) force. 
13
 When discussing needs, Burton moves from his critical posture of “problem solving” when 
dealing with the field of international relations to a “puzzle solving” approach when seeking to 
explore needs within conflict studies. 
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